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ABSTRACT
The role of a real interest rate and a credit aggregate as inter-
mediate monetary policy targets are investigated under the assumption of
rational expectations. The analysis expands a standard aggregate model to
include a credit market and a market determined interest rate on bank
deposits. This allows the implications for output stabilization of real
interest rate policy to be examined for a wider variety of shocks than
normally considered in the literature, as well as allowing a credit aggregate
policy to be studied.
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1.Introduction
During the 1970s, monetary authorities in a number of
countries reoriented the conduct of policy toward setting explicit
targets for monetary growth. Two principal criteria of this approach
('rieciman[1975})arethat the measure of the money supply be closely
related to the policy objective variable —usuallynominal income
growth —andthat the money supply contain reliable information about
the future path of this variable. However, instability in estimated
money demand equations in the mid—1970s and, more recently, the extent
and speed at which innovation has been occurring in financial markets
in response to record high interest rates, deregulation, the
computerization of the financial industry and other factors 1 have
raised concern about the appropriateness of using iaonetary growth
targets for short—run policy purposes. Indeed, two consequences of
financial innovation can be identified which would suggest (or in some
circumstances clearly have indicated) that the aforementioned criteria
are not being met.
The first involves the spread of cash management
techniques whereby transactions oalances are kept at a minimum. This
development results in a shift in the relationship between the money
supply and the ultimate policy objective, thereby rendering monetary
growth targets less useful unless the changing relationship can be
monitored closely. The second involves combining transactions and
savings balances, particularly those of the household sector, into an—2—
all—in—one account which earns a near—market rate of interest.2 This
development introduces an interest—rate—setting decision, or an
own—rate, into the relationship between the money supply and the
policy variable.
Because of these changing circumstances, increasing
attention is being focused on the possible role of real interest rates
as intermediate targets for monetary policy.In considering real
interest rates for purposes of conducting policy, four important
issues need to be addressed: Ci) what real interest rate measure
should be used (Feldstein and Summers [1978 ]),(ii)what ability does
the monetary authority have to control the real rate (Shiller [1980 ]),
(iii)what is an appropriate target level, if any, for the real rate,
and (iv) what are the consequences of focusing on real interest rates
as opposed solely to a monetary aggregate for purposes of setting
policy. In this paper, the last three issues are addressed with
particular attention being placed on the fourth issue.
As an alternative to both monetary aggregates andreal
interest rates, Friedman [1983 ]hassuggested that the close
correlation between nominal income and a credit aggregate be exploited
in the design of monetary policy. By incorporating a rudimentary
credit market, the model developed here can also examine the role of a
credit aggregate as an intermediate target for monetary policy.
In the next section, a basic aggregate, rational
expectations model is extended to incorporate a marketfor loans, a—3—
market determined interest rate on deposits, and a monetary policy
rule which permits non—borrowed reserves to deviate from a target path
in response to both real interest rate movements and movements in the
aggregate quantity of loans. The model is used, in section 3, to
examine the implications of such a policy rule for aggregate output
and price stability. Conclusions are summarized in section 4.
2. The Model
This section extends a standard aggregate rational
expectations model (McCalluni [1980 )toincorporate a market for loans
and bank reserves. It differs from the recent models of Parkin
[1978], Turnovsky [1980] and Benavie and Froyen [1983 ]byconsidering
policy rules which incorporate responses to a real interest rate and a
credit aggregate.
The real side of the economy consists of two equations.
The first is a very simple IS relationship determining aggregate
demand. This is assumed to take the form
(1) =8_r+€
where y is the logarithm of aggregate output and r is the real rate
of interest on bank loans, the only nonmonetary asset in the model; e
is a white noise disturbance term.—4—
The second equation, which completes the specification
of the goods market is an aggregate supply function given by
(2) y =y+c(p—
+u.
Equation 2 is a Lucas—type aggregate supply equation with 5and
Pt
denoting the logs of capacity output and the price level
respectively.The notation signifies an expectation of a
variable x formed at time t—1. This general notation is used
througnout the analysis and expectations are assumed to be rational.
The disturbance term in (2), u. is assumed to be a white noise
process.
The demand for loans is assumed to be inversely related
to the real interest rate on loans and positively related to income.
This latter effect reflects an assumption that both firms and
households increase their demand for loans as aggregate real spending
rises. The loan demandequationis then given by
1 = + + Vt
wherei is the log of the noatnal quantity of loans. Like u and
v is taken to oe a white noise disturbance cer.
t5 —




wheredt is the log of tue nominal stock of deposits, 1dt IS the
nominal interest rate on deposits, i is the nominailoanrate and
is a white noise disturbance term.
Banks are assumed to issue loans and deposits and to
hold reserves against their deposits.If banks face a downward
sloping demand for loans as a function of the interest rate on loans,
an upward sloping demand for deposits as a function or dt' and an
upward sloping supply of federal funds as a function of the interest









The demand for reserves by banks will be assumed equal
to requirea reserves; excess reserves are set equal to zero. If the
lo of the reserve requirement ratio is p and the log of total
reserves is trt,—6—
7) tr =p+d.
The supply of reserves has two components: non—borrowed
reserves nbc, the monetary authorities' policy instrument, and
borroweu reserves. To represent bank borrowing behaviour, assume the
ratio of total reserves (borrowed plus non—borrowed) to non—borrowed
reserves is given by
(8) trt —nb
=
C0+ C1i + C2l+ C3ift + e3.
Equations (5)—(8) provide a very simple representation of the banking
sector. For a discussion of the aerivation of such relationships from
a model of profit maximizing banks, see Benavie and Froyen [1982 J.
To link the real and nominal interest rates on loans,
the Fisher equation is assumed to take the form
(9) =rt
+ —Pt.
One key feature ot this model is that participants in financial
markets are assumed to have current—period aggregate information when
forming expectations about the one—perioc ahead rate of inflation. In
the supply function, however, appears. This can be rationalized
in terms of one—period wage contracts in the labour market and in
terns of quick processing an dissemination ot intoruation in
financial markets. This feature of the model is incorporated by using
— +Pt instead of (the more common) — as the—7—
real interest rate. As ficCallum [1980 ] has demonstrated, this
specification invalidates the policy ineffectiveness proposition
characteristic of one class of rational expectations models developed
by Sargent and Wallace [1975 ] and others by making the unconditional
variance of the expectationaJ. error forPt potentially dependent on
policy paranieters.
To complete the model, a specification of the monetary
authorities' behaviour nest be adopted. One formulation of policy is
that used by Poole [1970 } in which a fixed money stock rule is
compared with a fixed nominal interest rate rule. However, Sargent
and Wallace [1975 J have shown that under such an interest rate rule
tne price level is indeterminate. 6 Accordingly, policy will be
characterized by a feedback rule for nbt that allows nb to deviate
from a (constant) target in response to past fluctuations in the real
interest rate from its expected level.In considering a potential
role for real interest rates as an intermediate target, however, it is
important to bear in mind t1at the monetary authorities cannot
arbitrarily fix rt given the model's assumption that aggregate supply
equals aggregate uecaand. In addition, to capture the role of a credit
aggregate in the design of monetary policy, the monetary authorities
are assumed to adjust nb in response to unanticipated movements in
the stock ot loans. The feedback rule is assumed to take the form—8—
(10) nb =Ia +m1(r1 —2r1)+ — t—21t—1




=0,the authorities act to hold non—borroweu reserves at
the targetec level. If m1 the monetary authorities allow
to deviate fromIf,in the previous period, there was an
unanticipated movement in the real rate (stock of loans). At the
beginning of period t, when the monetary authorities are setting nbc,
rt and are not yet observable. Any feedback rule for setting nb
can contain only variables observable at the eric of t—1.'Ifrt_l or
differ from what had, at the beginrting of period t—1, been
expected, the expectational error is viewed as a signal of shocks to
the system. The monetary authorities are assunied to respond to
(r1 —t2'tland 1t—1 —t—21t—1'
rather ttian the underlying
disturbances (ui, v1, etc.) directly. As the interuieciate target
literature has made clear, this leads to suboptimal stabilization
policy (Friedman [1975 J).However,it is also the case that the
relevantclass of policies which are likely to actually be followed by
central banks, and wtiich have recently been proposed, are more closely
captured by a rule such as equation (10) than they are by an optimal
feedback rule.—9—
Obtaining the rational expectations solution to the
model is straightforward and the details can be found in the
appendix. It is shown there that
(11) it
where =
(ce,u, v, 'e1,e2, e3) and
and are 1 x 7









Equations(11)—(14)will be utilized in the next section to examine
the role of in1 and in2 instabilizing economic activity.
3.Policy Analysis
As a necessary prelude to any analysis of stabilization
policy, it must be shown that the policy feedback rule (10) does allow— 10—
themonetary authority to affect the behavior of the economy byits








Denoting the elements of it, by ir11, i =1,...,7,the conditional
variance of r can be defined as
2 —2 22 22 222 2 2
(16) ar =i [—a1.1i1)
a + 11rj3a+
22 2 2 2 2 2
+ lTlSael + lllóae2 +
where denotes the variance of the random variable x, and the
elements of 0 are assumed to be independently distributed. Dealing
first with the case in which m2= 0 (the monetary authorities do not
respond to the credit aggregate), inspection of the solution reported
in the appendix reveals + o as + Thus, making the level of
non—borrowed reserves respond to past unanticipated movements of the
real rate of interest allows fluctuations iti the current real rate to
be smoothed. In the Poole [1970 1analysis,the monetary authorities
can arbitrarily fix the nominal interest rate. Here, the monetary— 11—
authoritiescan fix the real rate, butonlyat the value
—1 —
=
($—y)which equates expected aggregate supply and
aggregate demand.
2 2 2 From (13), a =E j+as + Thus, a
policy of stabilizing the real rate of interest also serves to
insulate real output from financial sector and aggregate supply





while approaches a finite limit. Note that the financial
disturbancesv,and the e.'s, have no effect on either output or
prices under a fixed real rate policy. The price level is determinate
under such a policy because, from (10), expected future values of
non—borrowed reserves are given by m and are thus finite (see
HcCallum [1981 1)•
Havingdemonstrated that r is affected by policy in the
model, the consequences of targeting on the real interest rate by the
monetary authorities can now be analyzed in the context of the model
solution when m1 is finite. The general solution for y is given in
(13). Comparing (13) with (12) shows immediately that only in the
face of aggregate demand (c)shocks is there a conflict between real— 12—
interestrate and real output stabilization. To insulate r from
requires that =0which, In turn, requires m1 = From (13),
however, m1 =o'makesthe coefficient on in the equation for y
equal to 1. The appendix shows that stabilizing output in the face of
aggregate demand shocks would iequire that m(. 0, but insulating y
j
fromdemand stocks makes ce's coefficient in (12) equal to A
clear conflict exists between stabilizing r and stabilizing y. Shifts
In the IS curve cause r and y to move in the same direction. By
affecting interest sensitive components of aggregate demand, the
movement in r tends to work as an automatic stabilization mechanism.
If policy attempts to prevent movements in r, this automatic
stabilization mechanism Is eliminated and larger output fluctuations
result.
Under a pure non—borrowed reserve rule, m1=m2=O and the
coefficient on in (13) is less than one so that y responds less to
than under a rule which fixes rt. This result corresponds to that
of Poole's analysis in which a money supply rule is preferred if
disturbances occur to aggregate demand. The combination policy which
insulates y from shocks requires the monetary authorities to
reduce the current level of non—borrowed reserves if last period's
real interest rate was unexpectedly high (m1( 0).— 13—
Inthe face of the seven sources of stiocks modelled
here, the value of m which minimizes will be a complicated
function of therelativevariances of the underlying disturbances.
However, increases, for example, in the variance of the error term in
the money demand equation (4) would tend to increase the minimizing
value of m1. Thus, greater money demand instability calls for greater
deviations of the level of non—borrowed reserves from its target path
in response to real interest rate movements.
In rational expectations, equilibrium business cycle
models (Barro [1981. ]),itis usually not optimal to attempt to
stabilize output in the face of supply shocks. Barro [1976 Jsuggests
a policy criterion which, in the present fralAework, would call for




where Q= E(ee). If the monetary authorities adjust nbin response
to real interest rate movements in order to minimize ,itwill still
p
be the case that real output and real interest rates are cotapleEely
insulated from financial sector disturbances.
Suppose now the monetary authorities respond to
unanticipated movements in bank loans but not to real interest rate— 14—
movements(i.e. m10, m2 *0). It has already been shownthata
policy of stabilizing rt insulates real output from all but aggregate
demand shocks. If 1 is stabilized (around equations(1)—(3)
can be used to derive the associated expressions for unanticipated
fluctuations in y, r and p. From (1)—(3) we obtain
— = —8(r—1r)+
yt
— = — +U
=0 — +








(18)r —r=______________________ tt—1t a6 .+(14-a6) 8 11 12 1
—
(6428J)U —
(19)p— p = tt—1t a 6 + (1+c 6) 8 11 12 1
Equations(17)—(19) show that a policy which eliminates
unanticipated movements in a credit aggregate such as bank loans would
prevent money demand and banking sector disturbances from affecting— 15—
output,the real interest rate on loans, and the price level. For
these disturbances, then, a real interest rate policy and a credit
aggregate policy are equally effective in stabilizing output. As
indicated by equation (17), however, aggregate supply shocks,
aggregate aemand shocks, and disturbances to loan demand continue to
produce output and price fluctuations under a credit aggregate policy.
The factors relevant for a cotiparison of a real rate
policy and a crecit aggregate policy are similar to those important in
the Poole [1970 Jcomparisonof roney supply and nominal interest rate
policies. Under a policy which eliminates unanticipated movements iii
thereal rate, YttiY =%. Undera credit aggregate policy,
still affects output, but the coefficient on in (17) is less than
one. Demand disturbances have a snaller effect on real output uncer a
policy which prevents unanticipated fluctuations in bank loans than in
real interest rates.
On the other hand, ut and v influence under a
credit policy but do not under a real rate policy .Bothpolicies
succeed in preventing money demand disturbances from affecting either
real output or the price level.
4. Summary ano Conclusions
This paper utilizes an expanded aggregate rational
expectations model which includes a crenit market to investigate
possible roles tor real interest rates ana a credit aggregate as— lb—
intermediatetargets for purposes of short—run stabilization policy.
For this purpose policy is characterized by a feedback rule that
permits non—borrowed reserves to cieviate from a constant target in
response to past fluctuations in either the real interest rate or the
stock of loans outstanaing from expected 1CVCIS.
The analysis shows that stabilizing real interest rates
and stabilizing output and the price level (or nominal income) in
response to demand shocks is not possible. A non—borrowed reserve
rule, as with the money supply rule in the original Poole analysis, is
preferred in this circumstance. With pure supply or financial sector
shocks, output can be stabilized by stabilizing unexpected fliOVeUieflCS
in real interest rates, at the cost, for supply shocks, of increased
price variance. Moreover, the monetary authorities can only stabilize
the real interest rate at the value determined by equating aggregate
supply with aggregate demand.
Stabilizing output and the price level in response to
deiuand shocks is also not possible by following a credit aggregate
rule. However, oecause interest rates ntst adjust to prevent any
unanticipateci fluctuations in bank loans with such a rule, the
contributions of demand shocks to the variance in output is less than
in the case of a real interest rate rule. In contrast, stabilizing
credit in response to an aggregate supply shock would not prevent
output fluctuations as would a real rate rule, because the resulting
moveuents in interest rates have a proportionate impact on aggregate— 17—
aemand.With financial sector disturbances, other than those to loan
demand, the analysis shows the equivalence of a real interest rule and
a credit aggregate rule.— 18—
FOOTNOTES
1 Financial innovation in Canada has beenspurred primarily by market
forces, whereas in the United States, the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 has given additional
impetus to developments in financial markets.
2 The most recent example in the United States is theSuper—NOW
account which was introduced in early 1983. In Canada, most
chartered banks now offer daIly Interest chequlng accounts which
combine features of daily interest savings and personal chequing
accounts.
See, for example, Benavie and Froyen [1982] for an analysis of the
relationship between policy variables and the money supply with a
flexible deposit rate.
Moreover, in the United States, recently proposed bills in both
Houses of Congress seek to amend the Federal Reserve Act by
requiring the Federal Open Market Committee to establish targets
for long—term nominal or short—term real rates of interest. For
discussions of real rate targeting, see Hester [1982] and Walsh
[1983].
See Benavie [1983] for an analysis of monetary policy when the real
rate of interest enters the aggregate supply curve.
6 McCallum [19811 hasshown, however, that the nominal interest rate
can be used as a policy instrument to achieve a money target
without leading to problems of price level indeterminacy.
Turnovsky [1980] explicitly takes the view that an indeterminate
expected price level is not a problem if the conditional variance
is finite.
This differs from Woglom [1979] and Benavie [1983] who allow the
monetary authorities to respond contemporaneously to the nominal
rate of interest.
8 Because theerror terms in (1) and (2) are assumed to be serially
uncorrelated, t_2rt_l = is a constant. This would not
be the case if c or u were serially correlated.
If the objective is to minimize the variance of a
comparison of (19) should be made with (1/ a)( —u) since this is
when r—1r =0.The coefficients of both and v in
(19) are less than 1/c in absolute value.19
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Thisappendix outlines the derivation of the rational
expectations solution for Pt reported in sectIon 2.
Equations (3)—(8) and (10) can be used
dt, trt, and flbr yieloing a three equation iiodel of




where = Y2 _wi)(r 1_2r1) —
c—1 2 t—1 t—2t—1 )m2v_1.
A.1 can be solved for I to yield
A..2 i =




+ti3( —e3)—Lah3v— in2 h3
where Ii,i=o,...,5are functions ot the paraieters in A.1. Notice






A.3r h +( t0
+(jn2÷2 —Iui)(r 1—2r i)+h4(v_e1)+h5( t_e2)+h3
(*—e—my in t 3t2 t—1 2t—1
A.3,together with (1), implIes
A.4 r_1r(1+h2)1{( 1p)+h +
(h3+h4+h5)(p_jp)+h4(v_ei)+h5(4—e2)+h3( te3)}
LagA.4 one period and substitute the result, together with (1), into
A.3toproduce
A.5 (1+1h )r =h+( ôh1_i)(p÷1_p)+h2 _m2h3(ptlt2ptl) 2 to
+(h3+h4+h5)p+(m2ó"281&2—m1)(1+81h2)Rdlhhllt_lptt_2pt)
+(1— 5ihi)(p 2t 1)+h2 ci+(h3+h4+n5)(pj_zpj)+h4
—e—) lfh(v —e )+h ( ,—e ) t13t 14 tit5t2t
—mv —in
t3t 2t—1 22c1)
From (1) and (2),
A.6 r =8—y— +
ct—ut t 0— 24—
UsingA.6 to eliminate rt from A.5 yields the following equation in
the price level and expectations of the price level.
A.7 [(h3+h4+h5)+a1(1+3h2) n+
+ +
{m2h3—(1+ 81h2) 1(in2 61+11128162—m1)(16h1+h3+h4+h5) ]t—1t—2t—1
—(l+h1)u
—[h4(r_ei)+h5
_e2)+h3( *—e3) ]8i1+h)1(m 1'2"i [ —1
+h4(vj_e11)+h5( 1p1—e21)+h3( 41—e3i ]÷
[v÷ ]
wheren is a constant term.
0
Equation (A.7) can be solved for Pt by use of the method
of undetermined coefficients. The hypothesized trial solution is of
the form
A.8 Pt + +
wnere it' =i1it.3, •.11.7)
and (, u,v, ,elt,e2,
e3). Substituting A.8 into A.7, after using A.8 to evaluate the— 25—
expectationsterms appearing in A.7, and equating coefficients on each
side leads to the following set of restrictions on' and










Kit16 = 81(1—1h1)(ut5—ir16) +
Kit17 = (1-1h1)(,7—it17)+h3
KT1= — 81(1—h1)i1 +
+
81Qur11- 81(1+81h2)1Mh2 +8h3m2
Kit22= — 8i(1 6h1)'t22 +8i(1— dh1)(1+ 8h2)'M72 + I2





















Theseequations can be solved in a pairwise fashion for
1i' 2j
=1,..., 7.For example, the equations for and
can be solved with m =0to varity that im i. =1/a.. Hence,
2 m1+coil
— =0as asserted in the text.
Note that i =n/ is inaependent 0± m and m. so that
0 0 1
ttiepricelevel is well determined.